INTRODUCTION
One of the fields of Professor Karol Wolfke's scholarly interests was customary international law. In 1964 he published -Custom in Present International Law (second revised edition in 1993 1 ). The book is widely known and became one of the fundamental writings on the subject. In my contribution I will deal with some recent examples of identification of customary international law on State immunity by international and domestic courts and confront some of their aspects with Professor Wolfke`s understanding of customary international law.
I.
The idea that a State may not be proceeded against in the courts of another State since par in parem non habet imperium has long been the subject of controversy. Due to legal developments prompted by national legislation, national and international case law and academia, in the present state of international law, State immunity is not absolute, but is generally recognised where the dispute concerns sovereign acts performed iure imperii. It may be excluded, by contrast, if the legal proceedings relate to acts performed iure gestionis which do not fall within the exercise of public powers. But the exact scope of the exceptions is still disputed. The Council of Europe tried to solve some controversies in the 1970s. On 16 May 1972 the Basel Convention on State Immunity was concluded. The Convention entered into force but it binds only eight States. The regime of State immunity established by the Basel Convention influenced the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the jurisdictional immunities of States and their Professor Wolfke was right in his evaluation of the law-creating role of the ILC. Since it was established in 1947, the ILC has elaborated on crucial aspects of international law. Its reports, draft articles and commentaries are often referred to as a highly authoritative source of law. It is not surprising that, in the lack of a binding universal treaty, the ILC Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property and reflecting themthe UN Convention of 2004 -are often referred to by national and international courts. But before I refer to some examples let me first comment on the ILC competence.
Some time ago, at the meeting of the Legal Advisory Committee to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, we discussed the work carried out by the ILC in respect of immunities of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. The discussion focused on the competence of the ILC in regard to questions which have not yet been regulated in general international law and where the practice of States lacks uniformity or is even almost nonexistent. The matter is thus not so much the subject of codification as "the 2018] SOME REMARKS ON STATE IMMUNITY AND PROFESSOR WOLFKE`S CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW 220 progressive development of international law" within the meaning of Article 15 of the Statute of the ILC. Some of the members of the Committee were of the opinion that the ILC should deal only with the immunity enjoyed by the Head of State, the Head of Government and the Minister of Foreign Affairs which follows from customary international law, while excluding the other State officials since no treaty or customary norms concerning their immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction exist. These members of the Legal Advisory Committee were afraid not only that the ILC work may fail but also that the ILC will unnecessarily replace the States in their law-making function. On the other hand the ILC is empowered to develop international law and it is for the States to approve or reject its propositions.
Since the works of the ILC play such an important role, it is necessary for the State to perceive them as an element of the law-making process in international law and take an active part in a discussion on the ILC reports in the VI Committee of the UN General Assembly. This presupposes systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the reports by domestic experts and if necessary making political decisions. The examples below prove that the behaviour of the State during the "legislative process" in international law is not neutral.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, on several occasions, dealt with State immunity 6 while examining whether the right of access to a court, within the meaning of Article 6 para 1 ECHR, was respected. The Strasburg Court treated the grant of immunity as a procedural bar on the national courts' power to determine the right 7 and examined whether the measure taken by the State party is required by international law in relation to the test of legitimate aim and proportionality. 8 In all these cases the determination by the Court of the customary international law was crucial. 6 See e.g. cases concerning: employment at embassies: Fogarty v the United Kingdom, no. 37112/97, ECHR 2001 -XI, Cudak v Lithuania, no. 15869/02, ECHR 2010 and Sabeh El Leil v France, no. 34869/05, 29 June 2011 ; personal injury incurred in the forum State (McElhinney v Ireland, no. 31253/96, ECHR 2001-XI) In the decision of 2010 in Case Cudak v. Lithuania the Court had to identify the international customary law in respect to employment disputes in foreign embassy. Instead of examining State practice and opinio iuris the Court relied on the provision of the 1991 ILC Draft Articles and the 2004 UN Convention (not being in force and not even signed by Lithuania) which provided for no immunity in some embassy employment disputes (dismissal of the local employee not exercising public authority).
9 It referred to the commentaries appended to the 1991 ILC Draft Articles for support of its finding that the rules formulated in Article 11 concerning the contracts of employment "appeared to be consistent with the emerging trend in the legislative and treaty practice of a growing number of States". 10 The ECtHR noted that this must also hold true for Article 11 of the 2004 UN Convention. The authority of the conclusions of the ILC probably seemed to the judges to make their own inquiry unnecessary.
The next step was to determine whether this "emerging trend" (a new customary rule) is opposable against Lithuania. The Court referred in this regard to "a well-established principle of international law" that, "even if a State has not ratified a treaty, it may be bound by one of its provisions in so far as that provision reflects customary international law, either "codifying" it or forming a new customary rule" 11 . The judges then added that there were no particular objections by States to the wording of Article 11 of the ILC's Draft Articles, especially as Lithuania had not objected. Lithuania has not ratified the 2004 UN Convention but it did not vote against its adoption either. Unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned, a State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another State which is otherwise competent in a proceeding which relates to a contract of employment between the State and an individual for work performed or to be performed, in whole or in part, in the territory of that other State. 2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) the employee has been recruited to perform particular functions in the exercise of governmental authority; (b) the employee is: (i) a diplomatic agent, as defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961; (ii) a consular officer, as defined in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963; (iii) a member of the diplomatic staff of a permanent mission to an international organization or of a special mission, or is recruited to represent a State at an international conference; or (iv) any other person enjoying diplomatic immunity; (c) the subject-matter of the proceeding is the recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of an individual; (d) the subject-matter of the proceeding is the dismissal or termination of employment of an individual and, as determined by the head of State, the head of Government or the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the employer State, such a proceeding would interfere with the security interests of that State; (e) the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has the permanent residence in the State of the forum; or (f) the employer State and the employee have otherwise agreed in writing, subject to any considerations of public policy conferring on the courts of the State of the forum exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter of the proceeding." 10 Cudak v Lithuania (n 6) para 66, referring to (1991) II-2 ILC Yearbook 44, paragraph 14. It is worth to note that the ECtHR departed from its reasoning in Fogarty v. United Kingdom judgment cited above (concerning, however, recruitment; not the dismissal of the employee) granting a wide margin of appreciation to the forum state in view of the state of international law in relation to embassy employment disputes (cf paras [37] [38] The Court confirmed its ruling referring to few decisions of the Lithuanian Supreme Court. The first one of 5 January 1998 concerned unlawful dismissal from the US embassy (Stukonis v. United States embassy). Contrary to Article 479 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the absolute immunity of a foreign State, the decision was based on the doctrine of restrictive immunity; however, the Court required the request of a foreign State to apply the State immunity doctrine. 13 The second decision, that of the plenary of the Supreme Court of 21 December 2000 contains binding guidelines for the courts on "Judicial Practice in the Republic of Lithuania in applying Rules of Private International Law". It gives new understanding to Article 479 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a norm guaranteeing State immunity only for "legal relations governed by public law" (not for relations governed by private law).
14 However, the Supreme Court advised the lower courts to exercise their jurisdiction only if they confirm that the defendant State applies the doctrine of restrictive immunity (therefore on the basis of reciprocity). 15 In the third case, similarly to Cudak, the Supreme Court followed these instructions and found that restrictive State immunity doctrine should be applied towards Sweden 
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In the same way, the Court noted that France had not opposed the adoption of the 2004 UN Convention, and was in the process of ratifying it. It therefore found it possible to affirm that the provisions of the Convention applied to France under customary international law.
18 Similarly, the Court observed that French courts had moved away from the doctrine of absolute State immunity, especially in embassy employment disputes. The Court then went on to examine, on the basis of the facts, whether the respective applicants could be considered to be covered by any of the exceptions enumerated in paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the ILC's 1991 Draft Articles. Finding that this was not the case, it concluded that in upholding the objection based on State immunity the domestic courts had failed to preserve a 12 Cudak v Lithuania (n 6) 67. 13 22 Further the Court noted that Austria had signed and ratified the Convention. The United States has not ratified the Convention, but did not vote against it when it was adopted in the General Assembly of the United Nations.
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The Court was much more specific than in previous cases explaining the preparatory process: "The draft text of the Convention was prepared by the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) which, in 1979, was given the task of codifying and gradually developing international law in matters of jurisdictional immunities of States and their property. It produced a number of drafts which were submitted to States for comment. The Draft Articles that were used as the basis for the text adopted in 2004 dated back to 1991. They were subsequently further revised by the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. States were again given an opportunity to comment." 19 ibid, para 67. 20 Wallishauser v Austria (n 6) paras 59-60. 21 Oleynikov v Russia (n 6) paras 66-68. 22 Wallishauser v Austria (n 6) para 30. 23 The reasoning and the findings of the ECtHR in the above mentioned cases were questioned, i.a. by Libya before the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in Benkharbouche/Janah v Sudan Embassy/Libya. 31 The arguments presented by the Libyan agent are typical and to some extent justified, which was also noted by this Court: 26 Article 10 of the 2004 UN Convention "Commercial transactions" reads: "1. If a State engages in a commercial transaction with a foreign natural or juridical person and, by virtue of the applicable rules of private international law, differences relating to the commercial transaction fall within the jurisdiction of a court of another State, the State cannot invoke immunity from that jurisdiction in a proceeding arising out of that commercial transaction. 2. Paragraph 1 does not apply: (a) in the case of a commercial transaction between States; or (b) if the parties to the commercial transaction have expressly agreed otherwise. 3. Where a State enterprise or other entity established by a State which has an independent legal personality and is capable of: (a) suing or being sued; and (b) acquiring, owning or possessing and disposing of property, including property which that State has authorized it to operate or manage, is involved in a proceeding which relates to a commercial transaction in which that entity is engaged, the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by that State shall not be affected." 27 Article 2(1)(c) of the 2004 UN Convention reads: ""commercial transaction" means: (i) any commercial contract or transaction for the sale of goods or supply of services; (ii) any contract for a loan or other transaction of a financial nature, including any obligation of guarantee or of indemnity in respect of any such loan or transaction; (iii) any other contract or transaction of a commercial, industrial, trading or professional nature, but not including a contract of employment of persons. 2. In determining whether a contract or transaction is a "commercial transaction" under paragraph 1 (c), reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction, but its purpose should also be taken into account if the parties to the contract or transaction have so agreed, or if, in the practice of the State of the forum, that purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial character of the contract or transaction. 28 The way the ECtHR determined the customary international law on State immunity in relation to contracts of employment or to service of process will probably not fully satisfy Professor Wolfke`s requirements. Professor Wolfke would certainly repeat that it is already a truism that treaties frequently constitute a very important factor in the development of international customary law. According to him the treaty constitutes a precedent, an element of practice. As an expression of the will of the parties, the treaty is at the same time "evidence of acquiescence in everything that is part of its content". 33 But he warns that a treaty "can never of itself lead to the formation of international custom, because in international law the principle pacta tertii nec nocent nec prosunt is still valid. A treaty can, on the other hand, extend its binding force to other subjects of international law, if the conduct of such subjects -that is, practice -justifies the presumption that they accept the provisions of the given treaty as binding on them." 34 Professor Wolfke calls it "accession by way of custom". Certainly, he refers here to treaties which, like the Basel Convention, have entered into force. But he also admits that not only treaties themselves but also their drafts or travaux préparatoires may influence the custom forming process. However, he 32 40 "While in treaty law, in general, the active will of States aims at changing the reality, the essence of customary international law lies in certain factual uniformity in international relations which is ratified only by means of acquiescence.(…) But in the event of a dispute on the question as to whether a certain rule binds a certain State as a legal rule (…) precisely the existence (or absence) of presumed acquiescence in the rule" will be decisive (Wolfke (n 3) 161; cf Wolfke (n 1) 161 ff). 41 The statement of the ICJ in the judgment of 18 December 1951 in Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) is widely regarded as the leading authority for the persistent objector principle. The Court held in respect to the ten-mile rule of the delimitation of the baselines of the territorial sea applied by certain States that even if this rule "had acquired the authority of a general rule of international law", it would "appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast" [1951] ICJ Rep 131. 42 Article 11 (2)(2) of the Draft Articles reads: "Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) the employee has been recruited to perform functions closely related to the exercise of governmental authority; (b) the subject of the proceeding is the recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of an individual; (c) the employee was neither a national nor a habitual resident of the State of the forum at the time when the contract of employment was Despite the shortcomings of the ECtHR`s identification of customary international law in the above mentioned cases, its decisions have the potential to influence State practice. To prove the existence of customary international law in respect of State immunity, some judges of the ECHR`s State parties, will certainly refer to the ECtHR`s findings e.g. on the character of the norms enshrined in the 2004 UN Convention and would feel free from making their own assessment of the elements of custom.
Benkharbouche & Janah v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, Libya and the Secretary of
An example of the domestic court decision following the ECtHR rulings in this way is a judgment of 2015 of the Court of Arbitration for Sankt Petersburg in case Inpredserwis v. Consulate General of the Republic of Poland 45 on execution of payments for the rent of the house for the seat of the Consulate and the obligation to leave the building. We will leave aside the issue of the proper service of summonses (the documents initiating the proceedings were not served through diplomatic channels) and more importantly, the appropriateness of the evaluation of the facts by the Russian Court, and focus on the merits. But it is necessary to mention that it is difficult concluded; (d) the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted; or (e) the employer State and the employee have otherwise agreed in writing, subject to any considerations of public policy conferring on the courts of the State of the forum exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter of the proceeding." Cf. 43 Article 11 of the Basel Convention "Contracts of employment" reads: "1. Unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned, a State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another State which is otherwise competent in a proceeding which relates to a contract of employment between the State and an individual for work performed or to be performed, in whole or in part, in the territory of that other State. 2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) the employee has been recruited to perform particular functions in the exercise of governmental authority; (b) the employee is: (i) a diplomatic agent, as defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961; (ii) a consular officer, as defined in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963; (iii) a member of the diplomatic staff of a permanent mission to an international organization or of a special mission, or is recruited to represent a State at an international conference; or (iv) any other person enjoying diplomatic immunity; (c) the subject-matter of the proceeding is the recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of an individual; (d) the subject-matter of the proceeding is the dismissal or termination of employment of an individual and, as determined by the head of State, the head of Government or the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the employer State, such a proceeding would interfere with the security interests of that State; (e) the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has the permanent residence in the State of the forum; or (f) the employer State and the employee have otherwise agreed in writing, subject to any considerations of public policy conferring on the courts of the State of the forum exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter of the proceeding." 44 The Russian Court observed that Poland has not signed the Convention, but it also has not announced that it will not ratify it. Besides, the document of the Polish Consulate in the Court`s files demonstrates that restrictive jurisdictional immunity as a norm of customary international law was accepted by Poland. It was enough for the Court to conclude that, according the ECtHR`s stance, the above mentioned acts (including the Basel Convention) as customary law are applicable to Poland and as a consequence the Russian Court has competence to deal with the commercial transaction at hand.
However, the Court of Arbitration made the additional remark which seems inconsistent with the argument of customary law opposable against Poland. It referred to the Polish Court decision of 2007 in the case against the Ambassador of the Russian Federation obliging Russia to leave the building in Warsaw which was once used for Russian diplomatic purposes.
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According to Russian judges, since the Polish court has not respected Russian State immunity in this case, Poland, on the basis of the principle of sovereign equality, has lost the right to invoke immunity in the present case. Consequently, one would suppose that in the Russian court`s view, if the decision of the Polish court had been different, reciprocity would apply.
Contrary to this simplified method of the identification of customary international law is the approach taken by the UK Court of Appeal in Benkharbouche/Janah v Sudan Embassy/Libya. Professor Wolfke would certainly be pleased with the detailed discussion of all the relevant evidence of the exceptions to State immunity in employment cases concerning a foreign embassy in this judgment. The UK Court of Appeal carefully studied The UK Court of Appeal was not keen to follow the Strasburg court indiscriminately. It highlighted that the precise scope of immunity is still uncertain and the distinction between sovereign acts and non-sovereign acts is difficult to apply. Moreover, State practice and the decisions of national courts reveal diversity of approaches and views. In such a situation the ECtHR should be more cautious since "it is not the function of the Strasbourg court to make definitive rulings as to the position in international law." [38] , a case concerning the conduct of a foreign state within the forum state resulting in personal injury.) Nowhere is this difficulty more apparent than in the field of embassy employment disputes with which we are concerned in the present cases. Here, as we shall see, state practice and the decisions of national courts reveal a variety of different approaches and a diversity of views. Accordingly, while there will be many cases in which the answer to the question whether there exists an obligation in international law to grant immunity will be clear, there will be many others where the issue will not be free from doubt. In the latter category of cases it is not the function of the Strasbourg court to make definitive rulings as to the position in international law. In this regard we would draw attention to the concurring judgment of Judge Pellonpaa, joined by Judge Bratza, in Al-Adsani where they observed that "when having to touch upon central questions of general international law, this Court should be very cautious before taking upon itself the role of a forerunner" (n 6 at It brings us to the role of the courts in the identification and formation of international customary law. Professor Wolfke deals with both of these aspects. As far as identification is concerned he stresses the evidentiary value of the decisions of international courts based on Article 38 (1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which refers to them as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. The judgments of international courts, especially the ICJ, are of the decisive importance as evidence of customary rules.
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As far as the domestic courts decisions are concerned, Professor Wolfke takes the position that they are also covered under Article 38 (1)(d) ICJ Statute (the provision is general and refers to "judicial decisions") but they are of lesser significance as evidence of customary international law.
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This is mainly due to the fact that national courts, even if they base their decisions on international law, do that within the limits of national law. Therefore their decisions have to be carefully regarded and properly evaluated. "Apart from the role of decisions of national courts as evidence of ripe customary international law, we may recognize also their contribution as evidence of the elements of international custom. It cannot be denied that such decisions can, where appropriate, serve as at least indirect evidence of the practice and of its acceptance as law." 51 Professor Wolfke alludes here to the law-making function of domestic courts. He develops this aspect elsewhere: "Formally, the role of courts [both international and domestic/ AW] is confined to ascertaining and applying law which binds only the parties in the case. Any legislative competence ex officio, or binding ascertainment of customary rules for States who are not parties to a dispute, is out of the question. Considering, however, that the formation of international custom is spontaneous, what is important, it seems, is not the courts` function according to statutes, but the role they play in fact. And their informal share in the development of international customary law is undoubtedly considerable." 52 Professor Wolfke realizes that the courts, in order to make the decision, have to gather and evaluate all available material, which is rarely complete and univocal. Thus the decision as to the binding rule "often amounts to choosing the less doubtful alternative" 53 and "is always based, to a greater or lesser degree, on free evaluation. Hence it is a truism to say that a judicial organ ascertaining customs to some extent creates them". 
CONCLUSION
The assessment made by Professor Wolfke of the consensual basis of customary international law and the importance of both State practice and opinio iuris in formation of custom is still valid. 56 The judgments of the ECtHR concerning State immunity, cited above, are examples of the lessening of the requirements of consent. A similar trend is visible in the ICJ case-law on customary international law. The ICJ has only rarely relied on actual practice to determine the content of customary rules. It based its conclusions rather on non-binding resolutions of international organisations or on its own decisions. 57 This behaviour is the expression of the so called modern approach to customary international law. Both approaches, traditional (emphasising State practice) and modern (emphasising opinio iuris) have been criticised on many occasions. 58 At the moment, however, there is no better test for the identification of custom than that which was once proposed by G. Puchta 59 . The creation of custom is not instantaneous, it is a process with many participants including international and domestic courts. Nowadays more international courts are taking part in the identification of customary international law and also national courts are more active and more open to take part in a dialogue on its content and scope. The problem is, that to keep a proper balance, the courts should be cautious not to replace the governments (the executive) in their function 60 and the States must be vigilant on this point
